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2019


Life Improvement Science: A Manifesto
Life Improvement Science: A Manifesto

Lieder, F.

December 2019 (article) In revision

Abstract
Rapid technological advances present unprecedented opportunities for helping people thrive. This manifesto presents a road map for establishing a solid scientific foundation upon which those opportunities can be realized. It highlights fundamental open questions about the cognitive underpinnings of effective living and how they can be improved, supported, and augmented. These questions are at the core of my proposal for a new transdisciplinary research area called life improvement science. Recent advances have made these questions amenable to scientific rigor, and emerging approaches are paving the way towards practical strategies, clever interventions, and (intelligent) apps for empowering people to reach unprecedented levels of personal effectiveness and wellbeing.

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Life improvement science: a manifesto DOI [BibTex]


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Doing More with Less: Meta-Reasoning and Meta-Learning in Humans and Machines

Griffiths, T. L., Callaway, F., Chang, M. B., Grant, E., Krueger, P. M., Lieder, F.

Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, 29, pages: 24-30, October 2019 (article)

Abstract
Artificial intelligence systems use an increasing amount of computation and data to solve very specific problems. By contrast, human minds solve a wide range of problems using a fixed amount of computation and limited experience. We identify two abilities that we see as crucial to this kind of general intelligence: meta-reasoning (deciding how to allocate computational resources) and meta-learning (modeling the learning environment to make better use of limited data). We summarize the relevant AI literature and relate the resulting ideas to recent work in psychology.

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DOI [BibTex]

DOI [BibTex]


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Dynamics of beneficial epidemics

Berdahl, A., Brelsford, C., De Bacco, C., Dumas, M., Ferdinand, V., Grochow, J. A., nt Hébert-Dufresne, L., Kallus, Y., Kempes, C. P., Kolchinsky, A., Larremore, D. B., Libby, E., Power, E. A., A., S. C., Tracey, B. D.

Scientific Reports, 9, pages: 15093, October 2019 (article)

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DOI [BibTex]

DOI [BibTex]


Cognitive Prostheses for Goal Achievement
Cognitive Prostheses for Goal Achievement

Lieder, F., Chen, O. X., Krueger, P. M., Griffiths, T. L.

Nature Human Behavior, 3, August 2019 (article)

Abstract
Procrastination and impulsivity take a significant toll on people’s lives and the economy at large. Both can result from the misalignment of an action's proximal rewards with its long-term value. Therefore, aligning immediate reward with long-term value could be a way to help people overcome motivational barriers and make better decisions. Previous research has shown that game elements, such as points, levels, and badges, can be used to motivate people and nudge their decisions on serious matters. Here, we develop a new approach to decision support that leveragesartificial intelligence and game elements to restructure challenging sequential decision problems in such a way that it becomes easier for people to take the right course of action. A series of four increasingly more realistic experiments suggests that this approach can enable people to make better decisions faster, procrastinate less, complete their work on time, and waste less time on unimportant tasks. These findings suggest that our method is a promising step towards developing cognitive prostheses that help people achieve their goals by enhancing their motivation and decision-making in everyday life.

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DOI [BibTex]

DOI [BibTex]


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Resource-rational analysis: Understanding human cognition as the optimal use of limited computational resources

Lieder, F., Griffiths, T. L.

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 43, E1, Febuary 2019 (article)

Abstract
Modeling human cognition is challenging because there are infinitely many mechanisms that can generate any given observation. Some researchers address this by constraining the hypothesis space through assumptions about what the human mind can and cannot do, while others constrain it through principles of rationality and adaptation. Recent work in economics, psychology, neuroscience, and linguistics has begun to integrate both approaches by augmenting rational models with cognitive constraints, incorporating rational principles into cognitive architectures, and applying optimality principles to understanding neural representations. We identify the rational use of limited resources as a unifying principle underlying these diverse approaches, expressing it in a new cognitive modeling paradigm called resource-rational analysis. The integration of rational principles with realistic cognitive constraints makes resource-rational analysis a promising framework for reverse-engineering cognitive mechanisms and representations. It has already shed new light on the debate about human rationality and can be leveraged to revisit classic questions of cognitive psychology within a principled computational framework. We demonstrate that resource-rational models can reconcile the mind's most impressive cognitive skills with people's ostensive irrationality. Resource-rational analysis also provides a new way to connect psychological theory more deeply with artificial intelligence, economics, neuroscience, and linguistics.

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DOI [BibTex]

DOI [BibTex]


A Rational Reinterpretation of Dual Process Theories
A Rational Reinterpretation of Dual Process Theories

Milli, S., Lieder, F., Griffiths, T. L.

2019 (article)

Abstract
Highly influential "dual-process" accounts of human cognition postulate the coexistence of a slow accurate system with a fast error-prone system. But why would there be just two systems rather than, say, one or 93? Here, we argue that a dual-process architecture might be neither arbitrary nor irrational, but might instead reflect a rational tradeoff between the cognitive flexibility afforded by multiple systems and the time and effort required to choose between them. We investigate what the optimal set and number of cognitive systems would be depending on the structure of the environment. We find that the optimal number of systems depends on the variability of the environment and the difficulty of deciding when which system should be used. Furthermore, when having two systems is optimal, then the first system is fast but error-prone and the second system is slow but accurate. Our findings thereby provide a rational reinterpretation of dual-process theories.

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DOI [BibTex]

DOI [BibTex]

2017


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Strategy selection as rational metareasoning

Lieder, F., Griffiths, T. L.

Psychological Review, 124, pages: 762-794, American Psychological Association, November 2017 (article)

Abstract
Many contemporary accounts of human reasoning assume that the mind is equipped with multiple heuristics that could be deployed to perform a given task. This raises the question of how the mind determines when to use which heuristic. To answer this question, we developed a rational model of strategy selection, based on the theory of rational metareasoning developed in the artificial intelligence literature. According to our model people learn to efficiently choose the strategy with the best cost–benefit tradeoff by learning a predictive model of each strategy’s performance. We found that our model can provide a unifying explanation for classic findings from domains ranging from decision-making to arithmetic by capturing the variability of people’s strategy choices, their dependence on task and context, and their development over time. Systematic model comparisons supported our theory, and 4 new experiments confirmed its distinctive predictions. Our findings suggest that people gradually learn to make increasingly more rational use of fallible heuristics. This perspective reconciles the 2 poles of the debate about human rationality by integrating heuristics and biases with learning and rationality. (APA PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved)

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DOI Project Page [BibTex]

2017


DOI Project Page [BibTex]


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Empirical Evidence for Resource-Rational Anchoring and Adjustment

Lieder, F., Griffiths, T. L., Huys, Q. J. M., Goodman, N. D.

Psychonomic Bulletin \& Review, 25, pages: 775-784, Springer, May 2017 (article)

Abstract
People’s estimates of numerical quantities are systematically biased towards their initial guess. This anchoring bias is usually interpreted as sign of human irrationality, but it has recently been suggested that the anchoring bias instead results from people’s rational use of their finite time and limited cognitive resources. If this were true, then adjustment should decrease with the relative cost of time. To test this hypothesis, we designed a new numerical estimation paradigm that controls people’s knowledge and varies the cost of time and error independently while allowing people to invest as much or as little time and effort into refining their estimate as they wish. Two experiments confirmed the prediction that adjustment decreases with time cost but increases with error cost regardless of whether the anchor was self-generated or provided. These results support the hypothesis that people rationally adapt their number of adjustments to achieve a near-optimal speed-accuracy tradeoff. This suggests that the anchoring bias might be a signature of the rational use of finite time and limited cognitive resources rather than a sign of human irrationality.

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link (url) DOI [BibTex]

link (url) DOI [BibTex]


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Community detection, link prediction, and layer interdependence in multilayer networks

De Bacco, C., Power, E. A., Larremore, D. B., Moore, C.

Physical Review E, 95(4):042317, APS, 2017 (article)

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Code Preprint link (url) Project Page [BibTex]

Code Preprint link (url) Project Page [BibTex]


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A computerized training program for teaching people how to plan better

Lieder, F., Krueger, P. M., Callaway, F., Griffiths, T. L.

PsyArXiv, 2017 (article)

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Project Page [BibTex]

Project Page [BibTex]


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Toward a rational and mechanistic account of mental effort

Shenhav, A., Musslick, S., Lieder, F., Kool, W., Griffiths, T., Cohen, J., Botvinick, M.

Annual Review of Neuroscience, 40, pages: 99-124, Annual Reviews, 2017 (article)

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Project Page [BibTex]

Project Page [BibTex]


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The anchoring bias reflects rational use of cognitive resources

Lieder, F., Griffiths, T. L., Huys, Q. J. M., Goodman, N. D.

Psychonomic Bulletin \& Review, 25, pages: 762-794, Springer, 2017 (article)

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[BibTex]

[BibTex]

2014


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Nonequilibrium statistical mechanics of the heat bath for two Brownian particles

De Bacco, C., Baldovin, F., Orlandini, E., Sekimoto, K.

Physical review letters, 112(18):180605, APS, 2014 (article)

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Preprint link (url) [BibTex]

2014


Preprint link (url) [BibTex]


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Shortest node-disjoint paths on random graphs

De Bacco, C., Franz, S., Saad, D., Yeung, C. H.

Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment, 2014(7):P07009, IOP Publishing, 2014 (article)

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Preprint link (url) Project Page [BibTex]

Preprint link (url) Project Page [BibTex]